Knicks sign Quentin Richardson

General Manager Glen Grunwald announced Tuesday morning that the Knicks will sign free agent veteran swingman Quentin Richardson.

Richardson’s roster spot was made available after the team signed and then promptly waived forward-center Solomon Jones after playing in just two regular season contests.

Richardson previously played with the Knicks from 2005 until 2009, averaging 9.7 points and 5.0 rebounds in 28.2 minutes per game during his stint.

The 6-foot-6 Richardson is expected to augment the Knickss arsenal of shooters, while hopefully providing some reliable perimeter defense.

Richardson has long been known as an above average three-point shooter, particularly from the corner. In 2006, his second season with the Knicks, Richardson shot nearly 38 percent from distance.

A 12-year veteran from DePaul, Richardson played with the Orlando Magic last season but was waived during training camp last fall. His career averages of 10.3 points and 4.7 rebounds aren’t exactly eye-popping, and he doesn’t add much in the way of size to an already depleted front court.

However, Richardson has traditionally rebounded well for his size, and his solid defense could pay some spot dividends along a playoff path that could include Paul George, LeBron James and — more immediately — Paul Pierce.

Because he was waived prior to the regular season, Richardson is eligible for the postseason roster. The Knicks were also apparently eyeing Delonte West.

 

2010 Report Card: Danilo Gallinari

Perhaps Gallinari’s biggest accomplishment in 2010 was just as simple as staying on the court. The Knicks forward only managed 412 minutes in his rookie year due to a preseason back injury. The biggest question surrounding Gallo going into this season was not how well could play, but how much he could play. Being second on the team in minutes played (2747) was the best way he could answer.

As for his actual development, Gallinari showed that his rookie season wasn’t a fluke. The guy can flat out shoot. Granted he failed to live up to the spectacular shooting percentages of his rookie season, but a 57.9 TS% for a 21 year old is impressive. Best known for his three point shot, Gallo hit 38.2% of his treys at almost exactly the same rate of attempts as his rookie year. (2009: 6.3 3pa/36, 2010: 6.4 3pa/36). But Gallinari added a second aspect to his game, getting to the line. His free throw attempts nearly doubled (2.4 to 4.0 fta/36), due to some acting worthy of “Serie A.” Non-Italian speaking NBA fans might think he earned the name “Rooster” by the way he flails his body at the slightest amount of contact. When driving towards the hoop he’s smart enough to continue with the play post-whistle, even while his body is convulsing earning a fair amount of “and-ones”.

Another aspect of Gallinari’s game is his strong defense. Although he’ll never be confused for a defensive stopper, he’s quick, active and interested enough to keep his opponent in front of him. His steal and blocked shots are average at best, but he does provide good coverage on his man. Given his thespian prowess on offense, you’d hope he’d be able to add the ability to feign contact and draw charges.

There are a few weaknesses in his game he needs to round out. The first is his non existent first step. For a player that shows quickness on defense, Gallo lacks the deftness to get past his defender from the outside. This forces him to give up the ball often when on the perimeter, and appears as if he’s being passive on offense. Gallinari is more apt to put the ball on the floor from the mid/low post, so it isn’t necessarily his handle that is causing the issue. To become a more complete player, he’ll need to be able to create from the perimeter consistently.

Additionally Gallinari’s rebounding is nearly non-existent. Granted he does spend time defending the perimeter, but he is not aggressive on either side of the glass. Looking at his list of similar players, it’s clear that Gallo is lacking in this area in comparison to players of the same ilk. For a 6-10 forward, to be compared unfavorably to Tim Thomas and Quentin Richardson indicates a clear red flag in this area.

Despite his full blown hyalophobia and bouts of Griffin Syndrome Gallinari’s sophomore season was a success. Luckily he’s still young enough to address these issues. Should Gallo fix both of these deficiencies, some All Star games lie in his future.

Report Card (5 point scale):
Offense: 4
Defense: 3
Teamwork: 4
Rootability: 5
Performance/Expectations: 4

Final Grade: A-

Similarity Scores:

z-Sum FLName Year Tm PER TS eFG PTS ORB TRB AST STL BLK TOV
.000 Danilo Gallinari 2010 NYK 14.8 57.5 52.3 16.0 0.9 5.2 1.8 1.0 0.8 1.4
.058 Chase Budinger 2010 HOU 14.1 54.5 52.2 15.9 0.9 5.3 2.1 0.8 0.3 1.2
.058 Dirk Nowitzki 2000 DAL 17.5 56.4 51.3 17.6 1.2 6.5 2.5 0.8 0.8 1.7
.069 Luol Deng 2007 CHI 18.7 56.0 51.8 18.1 1.7 6.8 2.4 1.1 0.6 1.8
.070 Rashard Lewis 2001 SEA 17.3 58.7 55.0 15.2 1.9 7.2 1.7 1.2 0.6 1.7
.076 Martell Webster 2008 POR 12.0 54.8 51.6 13.5 0.9 5.0 1.5 0.7 0.5 1.4
.101 Austin Daye 2010 DET 12.8 54.6 51.4 13.7 1.3 6.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.9
.108 C.J. Miles 2009 UTA 11.8 54.6 51.5 14.6 1.0 3.7 2.4 1.0 0.3 1.4
.114 Omri Casspi 2010 SAC 13.0 52.9 50.2 14.8 1.4 6.5 1.8 1.0 0.3 1.8
.123 Tim Thomas 1999 TOT 16.0 54.5 51.1 15.9 2.2 5.6 2.0 1.2 0.5 2.0
.126 Quentin Richardson 2002 LAC 17.4 53.4 50.4 18.0 1.9 5.6 2.1 1.3 0.4 1.7

After a full season, we have a better idea of what Gallo is like. On the good side is that his efficiency is the second highest on this list, and his steals/blocks are near the top as well. On the bad side his rebounding is among the worst, and his PER is well below the top guys (Dirk, Lewis, and even Deng). What’s most odd is that there are three other youngsters on this list (Budinger, Daye and Cassipi). It’ll be interesting how the four separate themselves from each other as the seasons progress.

Refs Partly To Blame For Garnett Suspension

I watched the Game 1 of the Celtics-Heat series at my local bar, and happened to catch Garnett’s elbow live. At the time I turned to my wife and mentioned that he’ll be suspended for the next game. I also had to explain to her who Quentin Richardson was, how important Garnett was to the Celtics, and how the league will review the tape to issue the suspension. Today the league has announced that Garnett won’t be allowed to play in Game 2, which really isn’t much of a surprise to anyone. However there is one other thing that I noted to my wife. Garnett’s suspension is partially the fault of the referees.

I’m not saying that I condone K.G.’s actions, and I think the league did the (obviously) right thing. However, I think should the front offices rewind the tape a little further, they’ll find something that contributed to the melee. Watch this clip, that shows the action on the court right before the melee began. Pierce and Garnett execute the pick & roll while the Heat switch and Udonis Haslem is responsible for guarding Pierce. Haslem’s defensive technique is perfect… for an NFL cornerback bumping a WR off the line of scrimmage. The Heat defender gets his hands into Pierce’s midsection and gives him a hip check altering Pierce’s trajectory.

Haslem’s actions are a clear foul in the NBA, yet the referees failed to make the call. The NBA’s philosophy seems to be to allow the players, not the officials, decide the outcome of the game. By allowing the zebras to swallow their whistles in the most critical moments, the refs actually alter the course of the game much more than if they called it uniformly. In this case allowing for such rough play directly led to Pierce lying prone off the floor. Had the refs made the correct decision and called the foul at the proper moment, Pierce doesn’t end up on the sidelines and Garnett doesn’t throw a frustrated elbow at Richardson.

Physical contact is a part of the game, and getting a foul called on the opponent vindicates the players’ action and allows for them to, for lack of a better term, vent some steam. You can see this by viewing how angry some players get when they feel they were fouled and no call was made. The league did the proper thing by suspending Garnett, but they still have some unfinished business. Referees should be blind to regards of score, location, player, or time. Games should be officiated using the same criteria whether it be the first minute or the last.

Trading Nate, The Logistics

With Nate Robinson in D’Antoni’s doghouse it’s only natural for Knick fans to expect the diminutive guard to be traded. Nate is in the last year of his deal, and if he isn’t getting playing time now, then it seems unlikely that New York is going to tender him a long term deal. Additionally considering Nate’s instant offense and other tangibles, he’ll likely be courted by a few different teams. Hence it makes the most sense for the Knicks to move him this year, before they get nothing in return for their investment.

Unfortunately trades in the NBA are rarely as easy as finding a match in talent. You also have to be mindful of the salary cap & the rules that accompany it. For instance there have been rumors of the Knicks interested in Tyrus Thomas, but the teams couldn’t swap the two straight up due to the cap rules. And this is where things get interesting.

In the NBA any trade involving teams over the salary cap has to be within of 125% plus $0.1M of the contracts given up. This means if the Knicks traded someone that was making $4M, the most they could get back in contacts is $5.1M ($4M * 1.25 + $0.1M). However there is a rule in place for Base Year Compensation players (BYC) which is meant to prevent teams from signing players solely to match contracts in order to make trades. This was put in place to prevent teams from let’s say giving Morris Almond $10M to trade him with a future first for Luol Deng.

New York signed Robinson for $4M this year, but according to ESPN his BYC amount is $2.02M. This means that when calculating how much the Knicks can receive, we use $2.02M, and when calculating how much the other team can receive it uses $4M. Under the salary cap rules, a team that sends out $2.02M can only receive $2.54M in salaries, hence this makes it impossible to do a 1 for 1 BYC deal with a team over the cap.

Since the calculation is based on a percentage, the only way for a team to trade a BYC player is to include enough salaries so that the team is within the allowed threshold. Figuring out this how much requires a little bit of arithmetic. Solve for x where: $4M + X – (1.25*($2.02M+X)) = $0.1M, and X = $5.5M. So in order to trade Nate Robinson the Knicks would have to include at least $5.5M in salaries.

Knowing this makes for some interesting trade possibilities. One way to work a Nate Robinson for Tyrus Thomas trade would be to add shot-blocking bench-warming centers Darko Milicic ($7.54M) and Jerome James ($6.6M). If the Knicks wanted to shed some salary for the summer, they could include Jared Jeffries ($6.47M) and the Malik Rose trade exception ($0.9M) instead of Darko.

What if, as rumored, the Bulls want Al Harrington? Then the two could do Nate, Harrington and the Quentin Richardson exception for Thomas & Brad Miller. Too one sided for Chicago? Then perhaps the deal could be expanded to something like Thomas, Noah and Miller, for Nate, Harrington, Darko, and Jordan Hill. Although I don’t expect the Bulls to trade Noah so easily, it’s not a ridiculous deal. The Bulls plan on replacing Thomas with Taj Gibson anyway, and Al Harrington would probably eat up some of those minute and more. Between Harrington and Nate, the Bulls wouldn’t lack for scoring. They would be losing a bit at center, but Jordan Hill would give them a young option there.

In any case the Knicks and Bulls do have some options and flexibility in generating a trade. Moving Robinson is easier than moving David Lee because of the smaller salary. To trade Lee, the Knicks would have to pile on $10.1M in salary. Although you have to consider that New York isn’t likely to move Lee, given that he’s the team’s best player and leads them in minutes.

Lee Resigned Officially, Nate Resigned Unoffically

The Knicks have resigned David Lee to a one year $7M deal and have unofficially given Nate Robinson $2.9M with possible bonuses to increase the amount. Given how late in the off season this news comes and how neither player had any other options, the news is anti-climactic. With 9 days until the first preseason game, this means that last year’s rotation will return in full except for Quentin Richardson.

2009 Report Card: Donnie Walsh

It was with fanfare befitting a peaceful transfer of power from despotism to enlightenment that Donnie Walsh inherited Isiah Thomas’ job as New York Knicks president of basketball operations in the spring of 2008.  But as with so many European monarchs, African generals, and Spinal Tap drummers before him, the excitement surrounding Walsh’s arrival soon gave way, at least in part, to the grim realization that the pitfalls of previous years had not all departed with his predecessor.  An impossible cap situation, a meddling owner, and a frequently unmotivated core of players were all holdovers from the Isiah era which Walsh has been forced to address, with varying degrees of success.

Walsh’s first Knicks team finished with a record of 32-50, worse than three of the five Knicks squads that Isiah oversaw.  But Walsh’s job was never about 2009 and, unlike Isiah, he immediately proved willing to accept that short term failure was a necessary and acceptable side effect of true progress.  To this end, it is undeniable that the poker-faced Bronx native has moved a dysfunctional franchise in the right direction, but his advances have not come without missteps.  That these mistakes have come with little popular backlash is cause for gratitude to Isiah – critics of Walsh would be far more vocal had his hiring not come on the heels of such unmitigated failure.

If Walsh’s patience and indecipherability are his greatest qualities in negotiation, they may also be his best assets in avoiding the kind of criticism that is typicaly heaped upon New York pro sports executives by media and fans.  His stern demeanor and unshakable calm suggest to observers, even at moments of seeming misjudgment, that he knows more about the situation than they do and so deserves their trust.  A move-by-move analysis of Walsh’s Knicks tenure reveals a well-reasoned overall plan that has been tarnished by some truly baffling decisions.  With the belief that the moves a general manager doesn’t make are as important as the moves he does make, I offer this chronological assessment of Walsh’s first season-plus on the job:

May 10, 2008: In his first, and thus far best, major move as Knicks president, Walsh signed Phoenix Suns coach Mike D’Antoni to a 4-year, $24 million contract.  D’Antoni’s hiring has resonated with fans (seen in the sense of pride that came with a prized coaching commodity choosing the Knicks over a handful of other suitors, as well as the entertaining brand of basketball to which they are treated each night), Knicks players (seen in the career years put up by David Lee, Al Harrington, Nate Robinson, Wilson Chandler, and, for the first 50 games, Chris Duhon), and players around the league (D’Antoni’s relationship with soon-to-be-max-contract-signers LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, and Kobe Bryant may prove to be his most important asset as the Knicks’ coach).

Grade: A, and if LeBron’s affection for D’Antoni leads him to New York, it becomes an A-plus.

Draft Night, 2008: With the sixth pick, Walsh chose Danilo Gallinari, whose struggles with back trouble and flashes of promise have both been well-chronicled on this and other sites.  While the jury remains out on Gallo, we have a better idea about some of the guys Walsh could have taken.  Of the lottery picks remaining on the board at #6, Eric Gordon (chosen 7th, 14.98 rookie PER), Brook Lopez (chosen 10th, 17.94 rookie PER), and Anthony Randolph (chosen 14th, 16.94 rookie PER and an absolute monster of a summer league) have looked the most promising thus far.

However, simply lining Gallo up against these three doesn’t quite create a proper lens for evaluating Walsh’s choice.  Looking back through Chad Ford’s archives reminds us that Gordon and Joe Alexander (chosen  8th, 10.19 rookie PER) were the two most likely Knicks picks had they passed on Gallinari, and the early returns suggest that Walsh may have dodged a bullet by passing on Alexander’s unique, but extremely raw, skill set.

Grade: C-plus.  We all love Gallo and it’s tempting to give Walsh an incomplete here.  It’s also probably unfair to criticize Walsh for passing on Lopez and Randolph, as the former was universally regarded as low on upside and the latter as a potential bust.  Still, it’s impossible to ignore how well Gordon, Randolph, and Lopez would all fit into D’Antoni’s system, and one would be hard pressed to find a non-Knicks fan who would put an unproven 21-year-old who already has back problems on the same level as any of these three.  I think there are decent odds Gallinari will prove this grade wrong but at the moment this looks like an OK, but not great, pick.

July 4, 2008: Walsh signed former Bulls PG Chris Duhon to a 2 year contract at the full mid-level ($12 million).  The price tag here looks high now, given the lower salaries being handed out this offseason and the incredibly frustrating second half to Duhon’s 2008-09 season.  Still, the Knicks have never minded paying out  luxury tax dollars and Walsh brought in a point guard who generally stays out of his own way and makes his teammates better on the offensive end.  If Duhon’s ability to create easy baskets can turn Curry into a tradable commodity this season (it’s a long shot, but hey, a guy can hope), it becomes a great signing.  Until then, Duhon is a player who doesn’t set his team back on the court, creates reps for a young core in need of development, and doesn’t set the franchise back in its hunt for prime talent in 2010.  Pretty good move for the mid-level in a lackluster free agent summer.

Grade: B.

November 21, 2008: Walsh put on his Kevin Pritchard hat for a day and swung two trades that cleared up $27 million in 2010 cap room.  In sending Zach Randolph to the Clippers and Jamal Crawford to the Warriors in exchange for a useful forward in Al Harrington, a useless forward in Tim Thomas, and a soon-to-retire combo guard in Cuttino Mobley, Walsh dismantled the slim playoff hopes of what was then an above-.500 team.  More importantly, however, he overhauled the team’s long term cap position, picked up a trade chip in Mobley’s tax-free contract, and rid the team of two shoot-first players who were almost certainly stunting the development of their younger, more promising counterparts.   A complete no-brainer.

Grade: A-minus.  It’s a move any good GM would have made if it was available but, what can I say, it’s a good career move to succeed Isiah.

February 19, 2009: An unstoppable force (the Bulls’ desire to trade Larry Hughes) met an immovable object (Jerome James’ contract) and the unstoppable force won as the Knicks flipped James and Tim Thomas for Hughes.  Largely seen as a garbage for garbage deal, the move was supposed to make the Knicks slightly better in the short run without helping or hurting their long-term cap situation and, mainly, sparing their fans the nightly sight of James smiling and joking around on the end of the bench during 20-point losses.  A mostly useless move in the long run and maybe a net negative, as Hughes took some minute that would likely have gone to Nate and Chandler otherwise.  Hughes also brought back some of the poor shot selection and general grumpiness that had mostly departed with Crawford and Stephon Marbury, respectively.  In the end, the trade’s impact, positive or negative, was minimal and we stopped having to listen to Jerome James jokes.

Grade: C (in a one-credit class with little effect on overall GPA).

Trade Deadline, 2009: The Knicks engaged in a well-chronicled negotiation with the Sacramento Kings, who asked for Nate Robinson and Jared Jeffries in exchange for Kenny Thomas’ soon-to-expire contract.  With the Knicks still loosely in playoff contention, Walsh turned down the offer and chose not to rid himself of the nearly $7 million committed to Jeffries in 2010.  A puzzling, disturbingly Isiah-esque move whose questionability has been compounded by the complete disinterest that Walsh has displayed in re-signing Nate this offseason.  If Robinson is truly so expendable, and it’s likely he is, then why endanger the future for only a few months of his services?  This inaction made little sense at the time and makes even less sense now.

Grade: D-minus.

2009 Draft, Lead-up: Another instance in which Walsh seemed to contradict his general mission statement of financial flexibility, as he reportedly rejected an offer of the #5 pick and some expiring contracts for Wilson Chandler, Jeffries, and Hughes.  This rumor always seemed a bit sketchy from the Wizards’ side, but if this offer was truly on the table, I can’t imagine Walsh’s resistance to it.  Trading Jeffries is a desirable goal, Hughes has no long-term value, and Chandler, while a promising young player, is more likely than not to become an effective wing who is generally indistinguishable from any number of other small forwards in the league.  The negligible , if even existent, talent drop off from Chandler to the #5 pick in the draft (which turned out to be Ricky Rubio, though no one would have guessed it at the time) seemed a small price to pay for the disposal of a considerable financial obstacle.

Grade: D.  It’s worth noting that a few different versions of this trade were bouncing around during draft week, some of which would have been less of a windfall for the Knicks.  None of them, however, seemed particularly logical to reject as the Wizards displayed genuine interest in both Jeffries and Hughes.

Draft Night, 2009: Walsh played the hand he was dealt at #8, picking Jordan Hill after watching Rubio and Stephen Curry disappear in rapid succession.  An uninspiring, but far from disastrous, summer league performance has left Hill as a general mystery to Knicks fans at this point, but he’s big and athletic and he got enough numbers in college (although his FG% leaves something to be desired, considering his layup-and-dunk-heavy shot selection) to suggest that he’ll be a useful role player at the worst.  Walsh’s bigger coup on draft night was the effective purchase of Toney Douglas’s draft rights from the Lakers, just the kind of low-risk, solid-upside maneuver that the Knicks never seem to make.  If Douglas develops into a serviceable back-up point guard with a jump shot and an above average defensive skill set, which seems likely, this pick is a success.

In a final draft night move, Walsh acquired Darko Milicic from the Grizzlies by sending Quentin Richardson off on the first leg of his summer-long tour of NBA mediocrity.  Another low-risk move that might suit D’Antoni’s system well.  Given what he had to work with, a sound if unspectacular draft night for Walsh.

Grade: B-plus for draft night in a vacuum.  However, if you consider that Walsh could have had Rubio or Curry at five had he made the Wizards trade, it’s a C-minus.

Free Agency, 2009: I don’t know.  Do you?  I think Walsh was right not to pay for Iverson.  I would have loved a year or two of Nash at the mid-level, but I get the feeling that was never as close to a reality as we all were hoping.

If Walsh wins his ongoing staring contest with Ramon Sessions (17.65 PER, 23 years old) and signs him for two years at a low 2010 cap number, it will be a way better long-term move than signing Jason Kidd (16.95 PER, 36 years old) would have been, as the Knicks will acquire a young, affordable point guard who can defer to his teammates and can wait until after the Knicks make their big free agent splash to receive his long-term payout.

Additionally, Walsh has done well not to give in to unrealistic demands by either Lee or Robinson in a depressed market, but until their situations are resolved (ideally with Nate walking or taking a cheap one-year deal and Lee staying on for something near the mid-level), it’s hard to get a read on Walsh’s current plan or his level of confidence in the LeBron/Wade/Bosh sweepstakes next offseason.

Grade: Incomplete.

All told, Walsh’s tenure got off to a promising start but has suffered from several moments of seeming hesitance to take the final plunge and commit to any one comprehensive strategy.  Walsh has clearly leaned toward building for the future at the expense of the present, which is a welcome change from the Isiah era, but his unwillingness to part with anyone of value as a pot-sweetener in the unloading of bad contracts has stunted the Knicks progress toward an ideal 2010 cap situation.  As it stands, the team has a top-flight coach and more young talent and long-term financial flexibility than anyone could have realistically expected 16 months ago.  But one worries that Walsh has hedged his bets a bit too much and will fall short of a free agent jackpot next summer.

Overall Grade: B

2009 Report Card: Quentin Richardson

It’s amazing how Quentin Richardson’s 2009 season lines up with his career stats. Except for minor improvements in shooting and minor declines in rebounding, points scored, and free throw attempts, the two are identical.

Season G FGA TS% 3PA 3P% FTA FT% ORB TRB AST STL TOV PF PTS
2008-09 72 12.7 .510 6.3 .365 2.2 .761 1.3 6.1 2.2 0.9 1.4 2.5 13.9
Career 601 13.5 .499 5.7 .354 2.7 .712 1.7 6.4 2.1 1.0 1.6 2.6 14.7

Earlier in his career, Richardson was a more prolific scorer (16.8 pts/36 over his first 4 seasons) but it seems that injuries has robbed him of that ability (13.1 pts/36 since). These days Richardson’s main strength is his rebounding. He does try hard in other areas, including exerting effort on defense, but he’s just not very good at anything else. His three point shooting was at the league level (36.5%), but his overall offensive efficiency was way below it (TS%: 51.0%). The Knicks other swingmen, Chandler and Hughes, are both weak scorers around the hoop, yet they were still better at scoring from “close” (as defined by 82games). Of the three, Richardson had the lowest percentage made of “close” shots (eFG 51.1%) and the highest percentage of “close” shots blocked (17%). Quentin also sported the team’s lowest ratio of free throws made to field goals attempted (.13), a clear sign of poor inside scoring.

The problem wasn’t so much Richardson, but rather the Knicks’ reliance on him. Since coming to New York Q-Rich has started 85% of the games in which he appeared, including 51 of 72 last year. Wearing orange and blue, Richardson has averaged 28 minutes per game, far too much for someone approaching 29 with a moderate skill set.

For 2010 the goal should be to find a shooting guard that will allow Chandler to slide over to forward, or to get Gallo healthy enough for significant minutes at the three. Either of these should limit the time Richardson is on the floor. The Knicks were able to move Richardson this offseason for Darko Milicic to bolster the center position. This likely will open things up for Danilo Gallinari to assume more minutes at small forward.

Report Card (5 point scale):
Offense: 1
Defense: 3
Teamwork: 4
Rootability: 3
Performance/Expectations: 2

Grade: D+

Similarity Scores:

z-Sum FLName Year Tm PER TS% eFG% PTS ORB TRB AST STL BLK TOV
.000 Quentin Richardson 2009 NYK 11.6 .510 .483 13.9 1.3 6.1 2.2 0.9 0.1 1.4
.051 Wesley Person 2000 CLE 12.0 .528 .509 12.7 0.8 4.7 2.6 0.7 0.3 1.1
.058 Chris Mills 1998 NYK 12.7 .512 .462 12.8 2.0 6.7 2.2 0.7 0.5 1.8
.062 Raja Bell 2005 UTA 12.2 .527 .495 15.5 1.0 4.0 1.8 0.9 0.2 1.6
.064 Larry Krystkowiak 1993 UTA 11.7 .524 .466 13.6 2.0 7.4 1.8 1.1 0.3 1.6
.064 Walter Herrmann 2008 TOT 13.2 .494 .458 14.8 2.1 7.0 1.7 0.7 0.1 1.2
.075 Dennis Scott 1997 ORL 12.4 .519 .496 13.7 0.7 3.4 2.3 1.2 0.3 1.3
.079 Bob Hansen 1989 UTA 9.7 .512 .498 12.7 1.1 4.8 1.9 1.4 0.2 1.6
.079 Devin Brown 2007 NOK 14.3 .538 .493 14.5 1.2 5.4 3.2 1.0 0.2 2.0
.080 Keith Bogans 2009 TOT 9.7 .521 .481 10.3 0.9 5.7 1.8 1.2 0.1 1.2
.084 Maurice Evans 2007 LAL 12.1 .523 .476 13.3 1.9 4.6 1.5 0.8 0.3 1.2
.093 Tayshaun Prince 2009 DET 15.0 .516 .477 13.7 1.5 5.6 3.0 0.5 0.6 1.2