So, if David Stern…
let me be the next NBA commissioner here’s what I’d do…
Well actually, before I start changing anything let me say a few words about what is right and what is wrong with the league.
The NBA’s big picture is actually pretty good, all things considered (even if rumors persist about owners gearing up for a lockout).
What’s Right About the NBA?
1. The Product. Right now I’d say that the NBA offers the best on-field product, followed by MLB, with the NFL running a somewhat distant third among the three major sports leagues. That may surprise some given the NFL’s popularity, but that’s another post for another day. Suffice it to say that the top-to-bottom quality in the NBA right now compares favorably to any time since the late 80s and appears to be bringing the viewers back.
2. Competitive Balance. One of David Stern’s wisest decisions was to listen patiently to calls to change the existing playoff structure to a seed-by-record format, and then stick with the one we have. Stern took the long view, that competitive balance is dynamic and rarely more than a couple of drafts and free agent moves away from equilibrium. Playoff schemes from a couple years ago that tacitly assumed Western Conference hegemony would last forever already seem outdated.
Overall the league’s fundamentals are solid but beneath the surface there are issues that could become major impediments to success should they go unresolved.
So, What’s Wrong with the NBA?
As commissioner, I’d focus my efforts on what I see as the league’s two major problems under my purview.
1. Executive Talent. The biggest long- and short-term problem for the NBA is a serious shortage of executive talent. As I said in a 2007 post:
If I could play David Stern…, rather than tinker with playoff formats I’d look to find ways to replenish the pool of talented executives entering the league.
I would stake my legacy on creating a system to find and develop new executive talent both for the league office and the teams. Despite being light years ahead of MLB and the NFL in its hiring practices, NBA hiring is still pretty cliquish and that is a primary reason so many franchises remain stuck in mediocrity or worse. Teams just keep turning over the same set of guys and a few of their proteges. Although the number of truly wretched GMs in the league has dwindled, a lot of older executives need replacing–or will soon.
I would start an “Executive in Residence” style program, taking a number of top aspiring young executives into residence at the league office where they’d spend up to three years learning the NBA–not just one franchise. Their training would include working on leaguewide issues in the NBA, the WNBA, and the NBA Developmental League.
Residents’ salaries could be paid from a pool all teams pay into. Upon completion residents would be eligible to interview with franchises. Owners would not be required to interview or hire from the program, but all would need to participate (read: pay). In the immediate economic climate the costs might be prohibitive, but the key would be getting buy-in on a 3-5 year planning horizon. I suspect many owners would jump at the chance to hire young executives with a verifiable skill set, whom they may have already worked with at the league office. This might not be a cure all, but it would undeniably produce some talent, and there’s no reason it can’t be done.
2. The Lottery. As much as anything, the lottery’s perception problem undermines its legitimate purpose of replenishing franchises with talent. At the heart of the perception problem is a very uneven distribution of incoming talent, both from year to year and even within the same draft. Little can be done about that. However the current system exacerbates the problem by counting losses (rather than measuring performance), which gives one bad team a disproportionate lottery advantage over another similarly bad team.
I would reduce the lottery advantage for bad teams without completely evening the odds across all non-playoff teams, thereby lowering incentives to tank. Specifically, I’d split the 14 lottery teams into two groups clustered by performance and even the lottery odds within each group. The lottery would consist of one group of at least five “bad” teams and one group of “near playoff” teams. That should limit incentives to tank among the worst teams. The playoff hunt should limit the other teams’ incentives to tank.